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Abstract
This paper is an empirical research of a monetary policy rule for a small open econ-
omy model, taking Switzerland as a case-study. A time-varying parameter model of a
monetary policy reaction function is proposed to integrate various trade-o⁄s to be made
about various macroeconomic variables ￿in￿ ation, the output gap and the real exchange
rate gap. The Kalman ￿lter estimations of the time-varying parameters shows how rational
economic agents combine past and new information to make new expectations about the
state variables. The uncertainty created by the time-varying parameter model, and esti-
￿Acknowledgment. I would like to thank Hans Genberg, Charles Wyplosz and Tommaso Mancini for their
helpful comments. Gauss codes for this paper have been freely adapted from Kim and Nelson(1999), ￿State-space
Models with Regime-Switching￿.
1mated by the conditional forecast error and conditional variance, is decomposed into two
components, the uncertainty related to the time-varying parameters and the uncertainty
related to the purely monetary shock. Most of the monetary shock uncertainty comes from
the time-varying parameters and not from the pure monetary shock.
The Lucas and Friedman hypotheses about the impact of uncertainty on output are
revisited, using a conditional variance to test them. Both hypothesis are con￿rmed, using
the one-step ahead conditional variance of the monetary shock. An inverse relation between
the magnitude of the response on output to the nominal shock and the variance of this shock
is found, as Lucas had predicted. Moreover, there is a direct negative impact of uncertainty
which reduces output in the long-term.
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41 Introduction
Central Bank￿ s reaction functions are very fragile objects due to changing policies and uncer-
tainty about the future. Over time, the importance attached to con￿ icting objectives ￿in￿ ation,
the output gap, the rate of unemployment, the exchange rate ￿may change and policy makers￿
views on the structure of the economy may change. That creates uncertainty for the private
sector about the central bank￿ s monetary policy rule. This uncertainty is exacerbated by the
central bank￿ s changing policies that is represented by changing weights on the deviations of
key variables from their targets1.
This paper is an empirical estimation of a simple theoretical monetary policy rule with
time-varying coe¢ cients for the Swiss Central Bank (SNB). This paper does not assert that
the SNB formally uses such a rule to conduct its monetary policy. Instead, what this paper
claims, is that, an augmented Taylor rule that adjusts the short-term interest rate in response to
an output gap, deviation of expected in￿ ation from a time-varying target correclty re￿ ects the
SNB￿ s monetary objectives. In addition, the augmented rule includes a real exchange rate gap.
This rule should provides us some insights about the SNB￿ s sensitivities towards stabilising key
variables such as in￿ ation and the output gap.
The ￿rst goal in this paper is to estimate the changing coe¢ cients of a monetary policy
rules, using a Kalman ￿lter estimation of the time-varying coe¢ cients. The SNB strategies and
instruments change over the sample period, rules change, judgment or discretion is used at time,
1Harrison and Stevens (1976) : ￿... a person￿ s uncertainty about the future arises not simply because of future
random terms but also of uncertainty about current parameter values of the model￿ s ability to link the present
to the future￿.
5overruling the prescribed rules. This is re￿ ected by regressor coe¢ cients that would also vary
accordingly. A Kalman ￿lter algorithm will be used to estimate the time-varying coe¢ cients.
As a by-product of the Kalman ￿lter approach, recursive forecast errors of the policy instru-
ment, and their conditional variance are obtained.
The second goal of the paper is a variance analysis to decompose uncertainty that is caused
by time-varying parameters and other kinds of heteroskedasticity, such as a Switching Markov
regime heteroskedasticity.
The third goal of the paper is to assess the impact of uncertainty on the economy, by
testing two hypothesis: the Lucas (1973) hypothesis and the Friedman (1977) hypothesis. The
Lucas hypothesis predicts that unanticipated demand shifts do have positive output e⁄ects.
Lucas (1973) tested the hypothesis, using the unconditional constant variance of nominal shocks.
But what really matters for the behavior of economic agents, is the conditional variance, not
the unconditional variance. On the other hand, Friedman(1977) tests if increased volatility
of in￿ ation may raise the rate of unemployment and consequently lower GDP. To test the
Friedman hypothesis, I use the conditional variance of monetary forecast errors as a proxy
for the variability of in￿ ation rate. I test whether the time-varying conditional variance of
the monetary shock has a negative impact on the cyclical and potential output. Friedman
(1977) predicted that increased variability of in￿ ation rate causes a reduction in the allocative
e¢ ciency of the price system, causing a reduction in the national level of output. Both Lucas
and Friedman hypothesis were con￿rmed.
My main ￿ndings are as follows: (i) a time-varying parameter model of a monetary policy
reaction function is proposed to integrate changing policies and strategies, reactions and deci-
sions over various trade-o⁄s to be made about various macroeconomic variables ￿in￿ ation, the
output gap and the real exchange rate gap. The Kalman ￿lter estimations of the time-varying
parameters shows how rational economic agents combine past and new information to make
6new expectations about the state variables; (ii) the uncertainty created by the time-varying
parameter model, evaluated by the conditional forecast error and conditional variance, is de-
composed into two components, the uncertainty related to the time-varying parameters and the
uncertainty related to the purely monetary shock. Di⁄erent assumptions are made about the
monetary shock: homoskedastic errors are assumed and Markov switching regime heteroskedas-
ticity are evaluated in turn. The model does not show any GARCH heteroskedasticity as such.
Eighty percent of the uncertainty in a Markov switching regime heteroskedastic monetary shock
is estimated to come from expected regime switching and not from time-varying parameters but
this result is not signi￿cant; (iii) the Lucas and Friedman hypotheses about the impact of un-
certainty on output are revisited, using a time-varying conditional variance to test them. Both
hypothesis are con￿rmed, using the one-step ahead conditional variance of the monetary shock.
An inverse relation between the magnitude of the response on output to the nominal shock and
the variance of this shock is found, as Lucas had predicted. Moreover, there is a direct negative
impact of uncertainty which reduces both output in the long-term and the long-term growth of
potential output.
The rest of the paper runs as follows. Section 2 gives a brief outline of the post-Bretton
Woods Swiss monetary policy rules and strategies. Section 3 presents the Kalman ￿lter state-
space for the monetary policy rule model with time-varying parameters. Section 4 presents and
interprets the results of time-varying regressor coe¢ cients. Section 5 combines time-varying
coe¢ cients with Markov switching regime heteroskedasticity. Moreover, as uncertainty for the
public is increased by changing regressor weights, the impact of time-varying uncertainty on the
economy would be assessed in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
72 A Brief History of the post-Bretton Woods Swiss Mon-
etary Rules and Strategies
In his 1997 JME article, Rich (1997) provides a clear and precise history of the Swiss monetary
policy targets from which I brie￿ y extract the main points relevant to this paper. Prior to
the end of 1999, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) never announced a formal in￿ ation target.
However, it is widely recognised that price stability has been a primary objective of the Swiss
monetary policy.
Rich (1997) outlines three important policy principles of the SNB, of which the ￿ main ob-
jective￿was price stability. In￿ ation is largely a monetary phenomenon. Therefore, a strict
control of the money supply was key to ￿ghting in￿ ation. The way to achieve it was through
the control of the growth of the money stock, a monetarist approach of the Swiss monetary
policy. The three principles were: (i) the SNB regards price stability as the main objective of
monetary policy, (ii) if the SNB is to achieve and maintain price stability, it must keep a tight
control on the growth in the money stock and (iii) the SNB believes that it should "precommit
itself, as far as possible", to a policy rule.
On balance, as Rich (1997) notes, the SNB￿ s experience with monetary targets has been
positive. In￿ ation was lowered to acceptable levels from the peaks of over 10 percent in the
mid-1970￿ s to less than 1 percent in 2000, with an average of 3.3 percent over the period 1975-
1994. The SNB￿ s experience with monetary targets has been positive. A shift to a temporary
target for the CHF/DM exchange rate in 1978/79, held substantially above .80 CHF/DM to
stave o⁄ the continued appreciation of the Swiss franc, which risked endangering the Swiss
competitivity and growth. There was a return to annual monetary targets at the end of 1979
and a shift to a medium term strategy at the end of 1990. As annual targets were no longer
credible, the SNB adopted a ￿ve-year growth target for the monetary base.
8Broadly speaking, one can observe four main regimes over the sample period:
￿ 1973-1978: annual monetary growth targets
￿ 1979: exchange rate targeting
￿ 1980s: annual monetary growth targeting combined with increasing concern over the cur-
rency overappreciation
￿ 1993-1999: interest rate strategy
￿ end of 1999 onwards: medium-term in￿ ation targets
In the ￿rst half of the 1970s, the SNB modi￿ed fundamentally its approach to monetary
policy. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the Swiss authorities decided to ￿ oat
the currency in January 1973. The shift to a ￿ oating exchange rate enabled the SNB to pursue
an autonomous monetary policy and to decouple the Swiss economy from world in￿ ation. At
the end of 1974, the SNB publicly announced speci￿c targets for the yearly average growth
targets in the money stock M1, until 1978. In 1979, the SNB did not announce any monetary
target to temporarily target the nominal exchange rate to prevent an over-appreciation of the
currency that would have reduced the Swiss competitivity for its goods2. At the end of 1979,
the SNB returned to the monetary growth targets, but altered its target variable by substituting
the monetary base to M1. It considered monetary base to be more stable than aggregate M1.
However, the adoption of the monetary base target did not entail a fundamental change in the
SNB￿ s policy approach. As in the case of M1, the SNB continued to target a yearly average
monetary growth target of 2%, compatible with price stability in the long run.
2Rich (1997) writes: ￿The upvaluation of the Swiss franc started to concern seriously the Swiss public. It
undermined the competitive position of domestic industry and raised the specter of a slump in domestic economic
activity￿.
9The ￿ght against in￿ ation from the end of the 1980s to early 1990s was achieved at the
cost of the "longest recession in the post-war period and a substantial rise in unemployment,
reaching a level of over 5% at the beginning of 1994". Three consecutive monetary target misses
from 1988 to 1990 prompted the SNB "to reconsider the wisdom of setting annual monetary
targets". At the end of 1990, the annual growth target for the monetary base was replaced by
a ￿ve-year medium-term objective.
Even though the medium-term strategy was more sensible than the annual targets, it did
not stop occasional peaks in in￿ ation, especially after the German reuni￿cation in 1989-1990.
This led the SNB in the mid-1990￿ s to reappraise its monetary strategy and base its policy
decisions on in￿ ation forecasts rather than monetary targets. And at the end of 1999, the SNB
opted for an approach akin to in￿ ation targeting, although it did not treat its new approach as
in￿ ation targeting: (i) it set a quantitative objective for price stability: the rate of increase in
CPI of less than 2 percent. (ii) each quarter, the SNB established and published a forecast
of in￿ ation for the following three years, a period long enough to cover the lags in the e⁄ects
of monetary policy. (iii) if the in￿ ation forecast deviated from its objective, the SNB would
consider changing its main policy instrument. (iv) its main policy instrument is the 3-month
Libor rate of interest.
The changing monetary strategies could be translated by Markov switching regime models.
But it can also be re￿ ected by time-varying regressor coe¢ cients, re￿ ecting changing emphasis
on targets and control variables. The two types of models will be examined and compared in
this paper.
103 An Augmented Time-Varying Taylor Rule for A Small
Open Economy
Are rules used by central bankers or do they use discretion ? I would not like to enter in
the ￿ rules versus discretion￿debate which has been ￿rst introduced at the end of the seven-
ties by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) and extensively developed
thereafter. In this paper, I assume that the augmented Taylor rule with time-varying regressor
coe¢ cients used in this paper, given the information set, should re￿ ect how the SNB￿sensitivi-
ties towards key endogenous variables such as expected in￿ ation, an output gap and an exchange
rate variable, would have evolved in the way described thereafter. One thing that seems to be
true for the SNB, as for many central banks, is that (a) central banks use rules, much more
complex than the simple rule presented in this paper, but (b) they do not systematically or
mechanically stick to any of them. They use rules as an indicator to evaluate in which direction
is the economy heading, and complement this information with judgment and, at times, discre-
tionary manoeuvring. Although central banks vary widely in degrees of transparency, what is
quite explicit is the consensus over stabilising in the medium term, prices or its growth rate,
in￿ ation, and output growth around certain targets or equilibrium levels.
There is also a growing consensus that monetary behaviour, be it through a rule or even in a
discretionary manner, could be appropriately represented by some fairly simple rules. The use
of a Taylor-type of rule can, in a very simple manner, highlight those concerns by estimating
and looking at the weights that are attached to each term. As all variables, except for the
interest rate, are logarithmic transformations, these weights would re￿ ect the various elasticities
attached to each term.
Taylor (1993) suggested a very simple rule for monetary policy:
it = ￿t + r￿ + 0:5(￿t ￿ ￿￿) + 0:5e yt (1)
11where ￿￿ is the constant target in￿ ation rate and r￿ is the constant equilibrium real funds
rate, a ￿ natural￿or ￿ NAIRU￿rate, consistent with full employment. The Taylor rule suggests
that the central bank reacts to the deviation of in￿ ation from its target and output from its
potential. It is fairly easy to estimate a Taylor-type of rule, as in equation (1) by simply adding
a residual term to capture deviations from the rule and estimate the weights as coe¢ cients.
However, the main di¢ culty in estimating coe¢ cients of the Taylor rule is that the constant
(and even worse) time-varying target in￿ ation rate, the natural rate of interest and the potential
output are not known as they are neither observed nor are they speci￿ed by the monetary policy,
nor is the term period clearly announced, rendering such rules inappropriate at best or simply
inoperative at worse.
Several other problems can be noted with the original Taylor (1993) rule. One problem
is that central banks seem to adjust interest rates in a gradual manner, by smoothing
interest rates, by taking discrete jumps, 25 or 50 basis points, step by step. Another problem
is that a Taylor type of monetary policy rule as the above equation (1) is neither optimal
nor appealing for a small open economy highly sensitive to external shocks as is the Swiss
economy. In general, small economies in a ￿ oating regime are balancing internal with external
considerations in implementing their monetary policy. Thus, an appropriate speci￿cation of an
exchange rate term could address concerns of the private sector about loss of competitivity due
to overappreciating nominal and real exchange rate. As explained in section 2, the SNB had,
at times, overruled its monetary growth targets to stem an overappreciation of the currency.
All these issues have been the object of a previous paper, Elkhoury(2005), which estimate an
augmented Taylor rule with ￿xed coe¢ cients and analyse the role for an exchange rate term, if
any.
Including time-varying coe¢ cients in the Taylor rule would address the issue of changing
reactions of the SNB towards various macroeconomic variables. However, structural breaks or
12changing policies would not be captured by ￿xed regressor coe¢ cients. To take into account
abrupt occasional but recurring changes in variables ￿rst or second moments, one needs to
include into the rule switching regimes. Section 3 looks at a time-varying monetary policy rule.
Section 5 combines time-varying coe¢ cients with Markov switching regime heteroskedasticity.
Moreover, as uncertainty for the public is increased by changing regressor weights, the impact
of time-varying uncertainty on the economy would be assessed in section 6.
3.1 The Structural Time-Varying Parameter Model (TVP)
The ￿rst goal of this paper is to estimate time-varying regression coe¢ cients to re￿ ect central
bankers changing policies over time. As central bankers change their preferences for certain goals
due to changing of personalities at the helm of the central bank, changing emphasis, improved
monetary theories, improved ￿nancial technologies, the question arises for the econometrician,
policy analysts and central banker watchers to look for as much ￿ exibility in the model as it is
possible, based on tractability and simplicity, in-as-much as possible, supposing the model under
study was the ￿ true￿one, in the sense that it would ￿ plausibly￿track stylised facts. Asymmetries
can also arise from within the rule. In the vein of Krugman￿ s(1991) exchange rate target zone
model, one can suppose that non-linearities and asymmetries do arise in a rule, whereby as one
comes closer to a limiting zone or bound, of what is an acceptable, desirable or appropriate
upper bound or lower bound, central bankers would react di⁄erently than if they were in the
middle of the zone or close to an equilibrium value. Moreover, central bankers￿reactions at the
lower bound would be di⁄erent than on the upper limit of the bound, i.e. rules do not have to be
symmetric near to the bounds. Ranges of a bound could also change. Central bankers rarely
or never make these issues clear to the public. The structural TVP model would then provide
enough ￿ exibility to the regression model to integrate these various unknowns and uncertainties
in a state-space form that can be estimated by the Kalman ￿lter algorithm. Therefore, given
13an information set given by past data, one could extract the best possible signal in the sense of
a minimising the mean squared error of the variance-covariance matrix of the state variables, in
this case, the time-varying coe¢ cients.
I assume in this paper that the preferred instrument for the SNB is the 3-month Swiss Libor
rate of interest. The recommended instrument rate, i￿




t + (￿ ￿ 1)(￿e
t ￿ ￿￿) + ￿1e yt￿1 + ￿2e yt￿2 + ￿3e et￿1 + (2)
+￿4dmbe
t
In fact, the central bank prefers to smooth the rate over time with the following smoothing
dynamics for the actual instrument:
it = (1 ￿ ￿)i￿
t + ￿it￿1 + ￿￿it￿1 + "t (3)
where i￿
t, the recommended rate, and it, the actual 3-momth Libor rate, e yt￿1; e yt￿2;, is
the 1st and 2nd lagged output gaps, e et; the real exchange rate gap, dmbe
t is the expected
deviation of money base growth from a target growth rate; ￿e
t. The target in￿ ation, ￿￿ ,
is assumed constant and equal to 2 percent; r￿
t is the time-varying natural rate of interest.
There are many reasons to believe that the natural rate of interest is time-varying. Looking at
some of the determinants of the natural rate given by the theory, the natural rate of interest
varies over time in response to changes in technological progress, the trend growth rate and
shifts in preferences. All the equilibrium variables: r￿
t;y￿
t;e￿
t; the natural rate of interest,
the potential output, the equilibrium real exchange rate are smoothed by a Hodrick-Prescott
￿lter with smoothing coe¢ cient, ￿ = 1600: There is no reason to believe that the smoothing
coe¢ cient should be ￿ = 1600; except that this is the standard measure for the quarterly US
Real GDP. It would be of major interest to properly estimate the smoothing coe¢ cient on a
case-by-case study for each unobserved variable. Meanwhile, I am using the standard smoothing
14measure of ￿ = 1600: ￿ is the smoothing coe¢ cient in the ￿ smoothed￿Taylor rule equation. A
￿rst di⁄erence of the lagged instrument is added to the smoothing equation to stress that it is
not just the level of the instrument that is smoothed but also the changes in the instrument.
In this paper, I integrate all the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter estimations of equilibrium target
variables into my augmented Taylor rule equation, assuming time-varying regressor coe¢ cients.




t + (￿t ￿ 1)(￿e
t ￿ ￿￿) + ￿1te yt￿1 + ￿2te yt￿2 + ￿3te et￿1 + ￿4tdmbe
t (4)
Equation (4) includes an additional lagged gap term along with the ￿rst lagged output gap,
to allow for the possibility for the central bank to react not just to current variables but also
past ones, considering the long and variable lags in which the monetary policy a⁄ects the
economy. As explained earlier, the real exchange rate gap term, e et; is added to take into account
foreign demand for the small open economy model. ￿e
t is the expected in￿ ation rate.
The dynamics of adjustment of the actual level of the funds rate to i￿
t are given by:
it = (1 ￿ ￿t)i￿
t + ￿tit￿1 + ￿t￿it￿1 + "t (5)
The instrument takes a convex combination of the recommended rate, i￿
t; and the one period
lagged nominal interest rate. At time t, the monetary authorities set the level of the instrument
to a weighted average of the current recommended level (the ￿rst term) as well as partially
correcting the error between last period￿ s setting and the current recommended level (the second
term).
The Kalman ￿lter is applied to the state-space form to make inferences on the changing
regression coe¢ cients. What is new here is that the weights attached to each regressor are also
assumed to be time-varying. As the monetary policy rule changes over time, the weights at-
tached to each variable will also change accordingly. Assuming time-varying coe¢ cients allows
15one to capture time-varying monetary policies that would re￿ ect changing relative emphasis
on the di⁄erent policy trade-o⁄s that are at stake; trade-o⁄s between in￿ ation and output and
deviation from a target exchange rate. This could be interpreted as insight on how ratio-
nal economic agents revise their estimates of the coe¢ cients in a Bayesian fashion when new
information is available in a world of uncertainty and under changing policy regimes.
Substituting equation (4) into (5), we obtain the following TVP model to be estimated:
it = (1 ￿ ￿t)r￿
t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)(￿t ￿ 1)￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿t)￿t￿e
t + (6)
+(1 ￿ ￿t)￿1te yt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿t)￿2te yt￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿t)￿3te et￿1 + ￿tit￿1 + ￿t￿it￿1 +
+(1 ￿ ￿t)￿4dmbe
t + "t
Equation (6) is the key equation to be estimated in this model. In this equation, all the
regression coe¢ cients are time-varying and are to be estimated by a Kalman ￿lter approach
estimation.
3.2 Dynamics of the Regression Coe¢ cients
The random walk structural time-varying parameter model is a special case of a Kalman ￿lter
model approach. The model is a time-series as all regressors vary through time. In addition,
this model is also structural, due to the structural form relating dependent and independent
variables. The key to handling structural time series models is the state-space form (SSF). Once
in SSF, the Kalman ￿lter provides the means of updating the state as new observations become
available. Various ￿ltering procedures exist, using only past information or the whole sample
length. Updating and smoothing can only be carried out, once the hyperparameters governing
the stochastic movements of the state variables have been estimated. These hyperparameters
are themselves estimated by the Kalman ￿lter by maximising a likelihood function.
16In this paper, I use a ￿ltering and smoothing algorithm originally developed by Kalman in
the 1960s for engineers and then adapted for economists chie￿ y by Anderson and Moore(1979),
Harvey (1992), Hamilton (1994) and Kim and Nelson (1999).
Expressed in generic terms, the TVP state-space model analysed in this paper is the following,
with the measurement equation as follows:
it = Ht￿t + "t (7)
where it is the 3-month Libor interest rate, Ht is the 1￿9 time-varying matrix of regressors, ￿t
is the 9￿1 time-varying vector of coe¢ cients and "t is the ￿nancial innovation, "t~NIID(0;￿2
e).
and the transition equation is:
￿jt = ￿jt￿1 + ￿jt;j = 0;1;:::;6 (8)
where ￿jt is the jth time-varying coe¢ cient and ￿jt is the jth innovation, ￿jt~NIID(0;￿2
￿j):
Or, in a generic form,
￿t = F￿t￿1 + ￿t (9)
where F is the 9 ￿ 9 identity matrix I9 and ￿t~NIID(0;Q):
I assume a random walk process without drift for the time-varying coe¢ cients, as it is most
commonly assumed in the literature, c.f Kim and Nelson (1999). One could as easily assume
some AR(p), ARMA(p,q) process or even some non-parametric distribution process instead.
That would complicate the model in many ways so as to have to keep track of several lags
of state variables and to assume non-Gaussian distributions, and their impact on the overall
heteroskedasticity of the variance-covariance matrix. The di⁄erence between the two models
would be in the temporariness or long-lasting impact of shocks on the dynamic path of the
state variables which would indeed have di⁄erent implications to the overall model. There is
no a priory reason to choose one model over the other. ￿ Practicality￿of the state-space form
17makes the random walk approach more ￿ appealing￿as it requires less hyperparameters and state
variables to assume, thus less errors in the model estimation. Furthermore, in the Random
Walk model, because the regressor coe¢ cients are non-stationary, the model can accommodate
fundamental changes in the structure that are long-lasting. But other processes could be
assumed. That could be the subject of future empirical research.
Putting the model in state-space form, the multivariate system that we estimate, is the
following:
(i) Measurement Equation:
it = (1 ￿ ￿t)r￿
t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)(￿t ￿ 1)￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿t)￿t￿e
t + (10)
+(1 ￿ ￿t)￿1te yt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿t)￿2te yt￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿t)￿3te et￿1 + ￿tit￿1 + ￿t￿it￿1 +
+(1 ￿ ￿t)￿4tdmbe
t + "t
where the output gap, e yt, and the real exchange rate gap, e et, are the gaps relative to the
Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered potential output and the equilibrium real exchange rate respectively.
Equations (9) ￿ (10) constitute the state space system. Estimated con￿dence intervals and
corresponding standard errors for the estimates of the states, use Hamilton￿ s(1986, 13.7) Monte
Carlo procedure, which accounts for both ￿lter and parameter uncertainty.
4 Estimation Results and Interpretation
4.1 The Data
The macro variables that matter for the augmented Taylor rule are the output gap and the
lagged output gap, the real exchange rate gap, the short-term expected in￿ ation, the lagged
18nominal interest rate and the natural rate of interest. The data is quarterly, ranging from
1972:1 to 2003:3.
The monetary policy instrument is the 3-month Libor rate. For the Taylor rule, I construct
a nominal interest rate to re￿ ect, in as much as possible, the 3-month Libor money market rate.
From 1962/01/01 - 1973/12/01, the rate is the Euromarket 3 month big banks lending rate;
from 1974/01/01-1989/01/01, the rate is the 3 month Euromarket rate; and from 1989/02/01
- 2005/05/01, the rate is the SNB￿ s 3 month Libor rate lagged one month. I constructed this
interest rate due to two reasons. First, the Libor rate provided by the IFS database was not
correct in the early 1980s, a remark kindly pointed out to me by Georg Rich in one of my
discussions with him. Moreover, the SNB does not provide the Libor rates prior to 1989.
Expected in￿ ation, ￿e
t, is the CPI expected in￿ ation, is the expectation of average CPI
in￿ ation over the four quarters ahead. The expectations are based on an out-of-sample forecast,
using an AR(3) process with a 40-quarter rolling regression window. The target in￿ ation, ￿￿ ,
is assumed constant and equal to 2 percent, based on Rich(1999).
The output gap and the lagged output gap are the deviations of the actual log real GDP from
potential output. Potential output is estimated by a Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter estimation based
on a signal extraction problem using a Hodrick-Prescott smoother ￿ = 1600: The time-varying
natural rate of interest and the implicit in￿ ation target are Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter estimates
with a smoothing coe¢ cient of ￿ = 1600:
The base money growth target is constructed based on Rich(1999), table 1, p. 116.
4.2 Estimation Results
Rich(1997) explains that in the late 1980s, the SNB entered a turbulent period as it was con-
fronted with several unexpected disturbances. First, the real exchange rate showed an appre-
ciating trend which occurred right after the 1987 stock market crash and a perceived slowdown
19in real growth. In the ￿rst half of 1987, the SNB allowed the monetary base to grow slightly
above the target rate of 2 percent. Another substantial expansion of the monetary base
in the aftermath of the stock market crash magni￿ed the deviation from target. In 1988, the
conduct of monetary policy was further complicated by the introduction of the SIC, a new elec-
tronic interbank payment system which would alter the demand for base money. Up till the
end of 1988, the monetary policy was expansionary. From the end of 1988, the SNB gradually
tightened its policy in view of a more vigorous expansion in economic activity, a weakening
of the Swiss franc and raising concerns about rising in￿ ation. As in￿ ation remained high until
the summer of 1992, the SNB continued to pursue a tight monetary policy, tighter than it
had anticipated, causing the beginning of a recession that was going to be the longest of the
post-war era coupled with a substantial rise in unemployment.

























































































































































































































































Figure 1: Macroeconomic Variables
Looking at the Figure(1), we see that the output gap is positive around 1974, between 1980
20to 1982 and between 1988 to nearly 1993, and from 1999 to 2002 and is negative between 1975
to 1980, 1982 to 1988 and end of 1993 to 1998, and turns negative again after 2002. Short-term
expected in￿ ation is above 2 percent and high in and around 1974, between 1978 to 1986 and
1986 to end of 1993, early 1994. It then falls to below 2 percent.
The CHF/DM real exchange rate shows a continuous appreciating trend from 1974 to the
end of 1981, then it stabilises around the 0.8 ￿ target￿level, which could indicate that the SNB
intervened or threatened to intervene when the nominal CHF/DM reached that level; and if we
assume that in￿ ation in both Switzerland and Germany are very similar, than that is also true
for the real CHF/DM real exchange rate.
Given these very stylised facts,how did the monetary authorities react to the various macro-
economic variables and trade-o⁄s, according to my model of the TVP monetary policy rule
?
Table(1) reports the parameter estimates of the TVP model for the period 1975:1-2003:3.
Figure(2) presents the ￿ltered and smoothed dynamics for the regressor coe¢ cients. These
are estimates on how the SNB reacted on a period by period basis to the output gaps, the
real exchange rate gap, expected in￿ ation and the lagged nominal interest rate. Smoothed
estimates would be long-term estimates while ￿ltered variables are the 1-step ahead forecasts.
Deviations of the ￿ltered time series from the smoothed one could be construed as deviations
from equilibrium. A level for the 1-step-ahead coe¢ cient variable above the equilibrium may
signal a more aggressive reaction compared to the smoothed equilibrium while choosing a level
below equilibrium is a less aggressive reaction relative to the equilibrium.
The smoothed regressor coe¢ cients for the output gap varies between 0 and 2 with an
average coe¢ cient value of 0.84. At a time of high expected in￿ ation, at the beginning of
the sample period, the smooth coe¢ cient increases rapidly from a near zero value to nearly 2
in 1978:1, from which it then decreases steadily to 0.5 in the 1980s and stabilises around 1 in
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Figure 2: TVP Regressor Coe¢ cient: Filtered vs Smoothed Estimates
the 1990s, decreasing slightly to 0.65 at the end of the sample period, in the early 2000s. The
1-step ahead ￿ltered estimation remains above the equilibrium from the beginning of the sample
period, although it falls below the smoothed coe¢ cient value until 1979:2 and stays above the
smooth coe¢ cient up until 1986:3. From 1987 until 1993:2, the ￿ltered coe¢ cient on the output
gap crosses again below the smoothed coe¢ cient value, then onwards, it ￿ uctuates around the
smoothed coe¢ cient values. The 1994-1999 long recession could be associated with a sharp
reduction in the weight over the output gap, signalling increased concern over falling output
and a reduction in the weight attached to the output gap.
For the coe¢ cient attached to the real exchange rate gap, the ￿ltered and smoothed coe¢ -
cients are above 1 at the beginning of the sample and sharply drop to negative values in 1978:4.
This corresponds to a period when the SNB was worried about the over-appreciation of the Swiss
franc and intervened o¢ cially on the exchange rate market, setting a target of 0.8 CHF/DM in
1979. Ironically, this target has never been o¢ cially receded ever after. In 1979, there was real
22concern over the appreciation of the currency, thus, the SNB reduces the impact of exchange
rate gap on the monetary instrument. After 1979, it reverses again the trend, increasing its
impact again, though, to a level that is below the 1977 peak levels. We see another increase for
the smoothed and ￿ltered series to values just above 1 in the second and fourth quarter of 1988,
when the SNB is now fearing a too sharp depreciation of the Swiss real exchange rate. In the
1990s onwards, the weight on the exchange rate variable tends to decrease to ￿ uctuate between
0 and 0.5. These changing weights on the real exchange rate could explain changing policy of
the SNB towards the real exchange rate gap variable. The gradual decrease of both weights,
smoothed and ￿ltered, starting from 1990 onwards could signal a decreasing emphasis on the
exchange rate compared to the other variables.
The smoothed regressor coe¢ cient attached to the expected in￿ ation is above 1 at the
beginning of the sample period and decreases steadily from 1978 to 1998:1 to ￿ uctuate between
0 and 0.5. It increases above 0.5 in the last period. The ￿ltered coe¢ cient is above the
smooth coe¢ cient level at the beginning of the sample period until 1983:4 and remains below
the smoothed coe¢ cient until 2000. The time-varying coe¢ cient on expected in￿ ation is, for
most of the time, lower than 1, contrary to the Taylor principle. Taylor￿ s principle calls for a
coe¢ cient on expected in￿ ation above 1 to stabilise in￿ ation. It is possible that the one-period
ahead short-term forecast in￿ ation does not accurately re￿ ect the path to the medium-term and
long-term in￿ ation target. This could be better captured by the output gap which is a good
predictor of long-term to medium term in￿ ation. That would explain the fact that the rule puts
a higher weight on the output gap and less on the short-term expected in￿ ation. But, referring
to the Benigno and Benigno (2000) determinacy condition, the higher the smoothing coe¢ cient
on the lagged instrument variable, the lower the coe¢ cient on expected in￿ ation, given that the
coe¢ cient on the exchange rate variable is positive.
The coe¢ cient on the lagged nominal interest rate, both for the smoothed and the 1-step-
23ahead Kalman estimate, remains fairly constant around a value of 0.65. This suggests a gradual
adjustment of the funds rate to the rule. The interest rate rule puts more weight, each quarter,
on the lagged instrument, represented by ￿t;than on the natural rate, which is determined by
(1 ￿ ￿t):
5 Uncertainty and the Time-Varying Parameter Model
5.1 Modelling Uncertainty
After analysing the impact of changing regressor coe¢ cients, this section analyses the volatility
created by these changing coe¢ cients and error heteroskedasticity. Tsay (1987) and Bera and
Lee (1993) show that parameter heterogeneity in the random coe¢ cient autoregressive models
is a source of changing conditional variance such as Engel￿ s ARCH models.
The Kalman ￿lter is a recursive procedure for calculating the optimal estimator of the state
vector, given all the information which is currently available. On the other hand, smoothing is a
backward recursion, which enables optimal estimators of the state vector to be calculated at all
possible points in time, using the full sample. As a side-product, the Kalman ￿lter algorithm
produces forecast errors and conditional variances for the state vector and the measurement
equation. (For a brief outline of the Kalman ￿lter estimation, see Elkhoury (2004) Appendix
1, and for a more elaborate exposition, see Hamilton (1994) or Kim and Nelson (1999)).
The Kalman ￿lter is obtained in two steps:
￿ Step 1: the Prediction equations: At the beginning of time t, we want to form an
optimal predictor of yt, based on all available information up to time t ￿ 1 : ytjt￿1: This





￿ Step 2: the Updating equations: Once yt is realised at the end of time t, the predictor
24error,
￿tjt￿1 = yt ￿ ytjt￿1 = yt ￿ Tt￿tjt￿1 can be calculated, where Tt is the Transition matrix.
This prediction error contains new information about ￿t beyond that contained in ￿tjt￿1:
Thus, after observing yt , we can update our inference with a more accurate estimate that
can be made of ￿t; ￿tjt:
￿tjt = ￿tjt￿1 + Kt￿tjt￿1, where Kt = Ptjt￿1T0
tf
￿1
tjt￿1 , the ￿ Kalman gain￿ , is the weight
assigned to the new information about ￿t contained in the prediction error, Ptjt￿1 is the
variance-covariance matrix of the state ￿t, conditional on information up to t￿1, Tt is the
Transition matrix, and ftjt￿1; the conditional variance of the error forecast: The updated
state vector ￿tjt can be viewed as a ￿ weighted average￿of the predicted state vector, ￿tjt￿1,
and the new information contained in the prediction error, ￿tjt￿1.
The prediction error, ￿tjt￿1, plays a key role in updating the state vector ￿tjt. The greater
is ￿tjt￿1, the greater the ￿ correction￿in the updated state vector. Moreover, the larger is the
uncertainty associated with the predicted state vector ￿tjt￿1, the more weight is given to new








is the portion of the prediction error variance due to uncertainty in the state
vector ￿tjt￿1.













; and the prediction error due to the random shock to yt: Thus the conditional
variance of the prediction error, ftjt￿1, is a function of the uncertainty associated with ￿tjt￿1;
Ptjt￿1; and with R; the variance of the measurement equation.
Thus, there are two types of uncertainty that one has to account for when analysing the
impact of monetary policy shocks which may a⁄ect di⁄erently the economy: the uncertainty
25related to changing policies, that is represented in the ￿rst term of the forecast error variance and
the uncertainty related to the purely monetary shock, which is represented by the second part
of the forecast error variance, which will be assumed in the next sections to be heteroskedastic.
5.2 Conditional Heteroskedasticity
There are several ways of capturing a changing conditional variance that depends on past ob-
servations. In this paper, I investigate three types of conditional heteroskedasticity. The
￿rst model being the TVP model already discussed in the previous section. Another way is
the ARCH (Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) model introduced by Engle￿ s (1982)
and further generalised by Bollerslev￿ s GARCH model (Generalised Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroskedasticity). A third option is Hamilton￿ s Markov switching regime (thereafter denoted
by MSR) distributions for the variance.
The three types of heteroskedasticity are fundamentally di⁄erent. The TVP model does
not assume any a priori distribution for the conditional variance. It simply estimates it as
the conditional variance of the forecast error of the measurement equation in the Kalman ￿lter
algorithm. The unconditional variance, under ARCH is constant but subject to abrupt changes
under MSR models. Moreover, and as suggested by Hamilton and Susmel (1994) and Kim
and Nelson(1999), whereas long-run variance dynamics may be governed by regime shifts in
unconditional variance, short-run variance dynamics within a regime may be governed by an
ARCH-type process. Thus, MSR heteroskedasticity may be more appropriate for low frequency
data over a long period of time, whereas the ARCH type heteroskedasticity more appropriate for
high frequency data over a short period of time. Kim and Nelson remark, that, for a given time
series, it may be di¢ cult to distinguish statistically between the two types of heteroskedasticity
because the two models are non-nested.
In the TVP model, I decompose the uncertainty associated to monetary policy in two parts:
26the uncertainty related to time-varying regressor coe¢ cients, captured by Ptjt￿1, conditional on
information up to t ￿ 1; and ￿2
"; the uncertainty associated to the purely monetary shock . It





Table (1)3 report the estimates of the TVP hyperparameters of the model. Estimates of
zero or non-signi￿cant standard deviations signal a Null hypothesis of constant coe¢ cients for
the parameters. Looking at table (1), we see that the regressor coe¢ cients attached to in￿ ation
and the ￿rst di⁄erence in the interest rate are time-varying, with the rest of coe¢ cients not
signi￿cantly varying.
TVP MLE Prmtr Std. Dev. t-stats
sig_e 0.2542 0.1230 2.0674
sig_￿￿
t 0.1372 0.0320 4.2848
sig_e yt￿1 0.0974 0.0125 7.7795
sig_e yt￿2 0.0096 0.0281 0.3415
sig_e et 0.0001 0.0063 0.0210
sig_￿e
t 0.1372 0.0320 4.2848
sig_r￿
t￿1 0.0006 0.0206 0.0297
sig_it￿1 0.0006 0.0206 0.0297
sig_￿it￿1 0.0509 0.0294 1.7310
sig_￿mt 0.0049 0.0085 0.5808
Table 1: Time-Varying Hyper-parameters
3 The variance of the regressor coe¢ cient, ￿t; attached to the natural rate is assumed to be the same as the
































Figure 3: Time-Varying Heteroskedasticity
Figure (3) shows a graph of the changing conditional variance or uncertainty underlying
monetary policy. There is a ￿rst peak in 1974, at the time of the implementation of the new
post-Bretton Woods monetary policy. Post-Bretton Woods, the largest uncertainty occurs in
1979:2 with a peak of 12.6 percent. A shift to a temporary exchange rate target occurred during
this period. This uncertainty prevailed until at least 1982, with two other peaks in 1980:4 and
1981:3 with 8 and 6 percent respectively. As Rich(1997) explains, the SNB temporarily relaxed
the monetary targeting and imposed an exchange rate targeting. At the end of 1979, the SNB
reinstated the monetary targets, using the monetary base instead of M1, as was previously used,
considering the onetary base to be more stable than the aggregate M1. Smaller increases in
conditional variance occur between 1988 and 1994, a period of uncertainty related to the German
reuni￿cation period, the 1987 stock market crash and the SNB reappraisal of its monetary policy
targets to medium term monetary targets. It is clear from the ￿gure (3) that much of the
28uncertainty present in the early post-Bretton Woods era until the early 1980s, is reduced to less
than 2 percent from 1983 onwards. A new increase to 1.3 percent occurs in the early 2000, an
increased uncertainty that may be linked to the introduction of the euro.
5.3 A Time-Varying Parameter Model assuming the Existence of Markov
Switching Regime Heteroskedasticity(TVPMSR)
The Markov switching models are useful tools for capturing occasional but recurrent discrete
changes and endogenous regime shifts in time series. While the probability of switching from one
regime to the other could be constant, as in Hamilton (1989), Diebold, Lee and Weinbach (1994)
assume a time-varying transition probability that might depend on some underlying economic
fundamentals. In a Markov Switching Regime (MSR) model, turning points are treated as
structural events that are function of the data-generating process. One important feature of
such models is that they can capture a particular form of non-linear dynamics or asymmetry in
the policy rule, allowing for instance di⁄erent means and variances for di⁄erent regimes as in
Hamilton (1989).
As an alternative to the TVP model, I now consider a TVPMSR model, a time-varying para-
meter model with Markov switching regimes heteroskedasticity. Kim and Nelson (1999) remark
that the TVP model fails to incorporate changing uncertainties due to future random shocks
while the MSR heteroskdasticity model with constant regression coe¢ cients fail to incorporate
the learning process of economic agents. These considerations suggest a general model that
combines changing conditional variance due to time-varying coe¢ cients and Markov switching
heteroskedasticity.
295.3.1 Estimation Issues with TVPMSR
There are technical di¢ culties associated with Kalman ￿lter inference on the state vector and
the mean squared error associated to it to which Kim and Nelson(1999) propose e¢ cient ap-
proximations to solve it. In the state-space MSR model, the goal is to form a forecast of the
state (here the regressor coe¢ cient) vector ￿t based not just on the information set up to time
(t ￿ 1),  t￿1, but also conditional on the random regime state St = j and St￿1 = i prevailing















j t￿1;St = j;St￿1 = i
￿
;
The KF algorithm calculates M2 such forecasts for each date t; corresponding to each possible
value for i;j: Each iteration of the KF produces an M-fold increase in the number of cases to
consider. If M=2, i.e two regimes, by the time t = 10; there would be 1,000 cases to consider.
Kim and Nelson(1999) introduce some approximations to collapse the M2 posteriors at each
iteration to M posterior distributions, taking weighted averages over the states at time t, to
make the ￿lter operable.
5.3.2 Model Speci￿cation of the TVPMSR Heteroskedasticity
The TVPMSR model which I consider is a 2-state switching regime heteroskedasticity with the
following state-space form:
it = Ht￿t + "it (12)
￿t = F￿t￿1 + ￿t (13)
where Ht = (￿￿
t; e yt￿1; e yt￿2;e et￿1;￿e
t;r￿
t;it￿1;￿it￿1;dme
t) is a 1 ￿ 9 time-varying matrix of
regressors, ￿t is a 9 ￿ 1 vector of time-varying regressor coe¢ cients.
The monetary shock, "it~N(0;￿2
i;St); is assumed to follow a 2-state Markov switching regime










where transition probabilities Prob[St = 1jSt￿1 = 1] = p11 and Prob[St = 0jSt￿1 = 0] =
p00; and ￿t~iidN(0;Q):
The TVPMSR can be viewed as an alternative to the TVPGARCH heteroskedastic model.
A fundamental di⁄erence with the latter is that part of the changes in conditional variance of
the forecast error can result from endogenous regime changes. For the TVPMSR model, the












2t;i;j = 0;1; (16)
where xt is the 9x1 regressor vector, Pi
tjt￿1 is the mean squared error matrix of ￿
i
tjt￿1; an
inference of ￿t based on information up to time (t ￿ 1); given St￿1 = i: ￿2
j is the variance of















The uncertainty term would be calculated as follows:
e ft = e f1t + e f2t (17)




Kim and Nelson(1999), ch.5, p.119-120 for more details).
Again, the above equation states that the conditional variance of the forecast errors consists
of two terms: the conditional variance related to the uncertainty due to changing coe¢ cients,
f1t, and the conditional variance due to the regime change heteroskedasticity. The former is
dependent on St￿1 = i, the regime at date (t ￿ 1) and the latter is dependent upon St = j, the
regime at time t:
315.3.3 Results
Figure (4,5) shows the decomposition of the monetary shock uncertainty between the time-
varying parameter uncertainty and the uncertainty due to switching regime heteroskedasticity.
Around 80 percent of the variation comes from the time-varying parameter heteroskedasticity
and only 20 percent from the regime switching heteroskedasticity. Moreover, both the variances
for the low in￿ ation regime and high in￿ ation regime, sig_e_0 and sig_e_1 respectively, are
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. The degree of uncertainty about the type of regime, whether
a regime 0 with expected low in￿ ation and low interest rate or a regime 1 of expected high































































































































Cond. Var Decomposition: TVP vs MSR
Figure 4: TVP-Markov Switching Regime Heteroskedasticity
The next Figure (6) con￿rms the ￿ndings. The ￿ltered and smoothed probability of being
in regime 0, a regime with low in￿ ation target, is approximately 30 precent at the beginning of
the period, 1975 and gradually increases to 100 percent at the end of the 1980s, 1988 to be more
precies. However, this probability falls abruptly to 2 percent in 1988:1 and hovers below 30
percent until the beginning of the 1990s where it again climbs towards 90 percent, ￿ uctuating
in the 1990s between 60 percent and 95 percent to reaching nealry 100 percent at the end of
the 1990s. 1988:1 was a time when the SIC system became operative and close to the German
reuni￿cation. Rich(1997) observes that the a new electronic interbank payment system was
introduced in 1987 the Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC) system which became fully operative
















































Figure 5: Shares of Cond.Var. Decomposition: TVP vs MSR
in 1988 and reduced drastically the balances of base money the banks required to settle their
payments. However, this new system put the SNB "in the dark" as forecast of money base
demand became unreliable. Meanwhile, the impact of the German reuni￿cation in October
1990 was also unpredictable for the Swiss economy. However, at the end of 1990, the SNB
decided to shift to a medium-term strategy for the growth target of the money base. In￿ ation
increased between 1988 to 1993 and price stability was restored in 1994. In￿ ation remained
below the 2 percent level thereafter, achieving to reducing structurally the level of expected
in￿ ation to below the 2 percent level after 1993. The expected duration of the high in￿ ation
regime was estimated to be about 6 years and that of the low in￿ ation regime to be about 15.6
years, highly persistent level of low in￿ ation regime, larger than the US standard business cycle
of 8-10 years.






























































































Figure 6: Markov Probability of Low In￿ ation Regime (Regime 0)
6 An Empirical Test for the Lucas and Friedman Hypoth-
esis
As a by-product of the Kalman ￿lter approach, recursive forecast errors of the policy instrument,
and their conditional variance are obtained. The third goal of this paper is to test two hypoth-
esis: the Lucas (1973) hypothesis and the Friedman (1977) hypothesis. The Lucas hypothesis
predicts a negative relationship between the variance of nominal shocks and the magnitude of
the output response to nominal shocks. Lucas (1973) has examined the hypothesis, using the
unconditional constant variance of nominal shocks. But what really matters for the behavior
of economic agents, is the conditional variance, given the information set up to time t-1, not
the unconditional variance. In this paper, I use a time-varying conditional variance to test the
Lucas hypothesis. Friedman (1977) predicted that increased variability of in￿ ation rate causes
a reduction in the allocative e¢ ciency of the price system, causing a reduction in the national
35level of output. The conditional variance of monetary forecast errors is used as a proxy for the
variability of in￿ ation rate and the Friedman hypothesis is also tested in this paper.
Solving the Lucas(1973)￿ s island model for output and price in￿ ation, Lucas gets the following
two equations:
yc;t = ￿￿￿ + ￿shockt + ￿yc;t￿1 (18)
￿Pt = ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)shockt + ￿shockt￿1 ￿ ￿￿yc;t￿1 (19)
The object of Lucas(1973) paper was not to explain output and price level movements within
a given country but to see whether the terms of the output-in￿ ation ￿ trade-o⁄￿vary across
countries in an inverse manner. Lucas predicts an inverse relationship between the magnitude
of the response to the nominal shock and the variance of this shock. To test his hypothesis,
Lucas assumes that reaction to the shock and the variance of the shock are steady within a
country but vary across countries. He takes a panel of 18 countries. His output gap is a
deviation from a time trend.
To test the Lucas hypothesis for the case of Switzerland, I assume time-varying shocks
and time-varying conditional variance. Instead of the Lucas(1973) de￿ned output gap as the
deviation from a time trend, I use for the output gap, the deviation of output from a smoothed
Kalman estimated variable trend, the potential output. I test the Lucas hypothesis in two
steps. Step 1 estimates equation (18) with time-varying coe¢ cients:
e yc;t = ￿￿t + ￿tshockt + ￿te yc;t￿1 + "t (20)
where e yc;t is the output gap, shockt is the forecast error for the monetary shock; the three
time-varying regressor coe¢ cients are signi￿cant and of the correct sign.
The mean values in Lucas(1973) for ￿;￿ have to be positive and below 1. Lucas￿ s estimaste
for ￿ are [.287,.910] and for ￿ are [.178,.937].
36In step 2, I regress the estimate of the time-varying parameter ￿t;b ￿t; on the conditional
variance of the nominal shock, CVt = ftjt￿1;




CVt + ￿t (21)
R2 = 0:02 (22)
where standard deviations are in brackets. I ￿nd a negative and signi￿cant relation
between the parameter b ￿t and the conditional variance CVt;￿1 = ￿0:0016: Thus, there is
an output-in￿ ation trade-o⁄. The higher the uncertainty on in￿ ation, the lower the nominal
impact on output. However, this impact is quite small, of the order of 1:6 ￿ 10￿3: for a 1
percent increase in the uncertainty, there is a 1:6￿10￿3 decrease in the nominal impact on the
output gap.
Next, to test for the Friedman hypothesis, I regress the dependent variable on a constant,
the shock, the conditional variance and the product of the shock by the log of the conditional
variance:
yt = ￿0 + ￿1shockt + ￿2shockt:ln(CVt) + ￿3CVt + +￿4CVt￿1 + "t (23)
I run two regressions, changing the dependent variable such as:
(i)the ￿rst di⁄erence of output gap. Running the regression in levels, the coe¢ cient on the
lagged output gap is close to 1. To avoid a unit root case, I turn into ￿rst di⁄erences.
(ii) the ￿rst di⁄erence of potential output
Standard deviations are in brackets. I get:



























The direct impact of the nominal shock on the dependent variable is positive in both cases
but not always signi￿cant. Controlling for the shock and cross-terms, I ￿nd, again, in both
cases, there is a direct negative impact of the uncertainty on the output gap and the potential
output gap, the e⁄ect of the uncertainty, lagged one period, being signi￿cant to 5 percent and
1 perccent respectively. Moreover, in equation(25); nearly 15 percent of the drop in growth
output is explained by the e⁄ects of uncertainty and the forecast error over the growth rate.
The rest would be explained by other variables, like productivity growth, investment strategies,
labour reform policies and other variables.
7 Conclusion
A conventional ￿xed-coe¢ cient model of a Taylor-type monetery policy rule does not integrate
the learning process by economic agents about the economy. In this paper, a time-varying
parameter model of a monetary policy reaction function was proposed to integrate such changing
policies and strategies, reactions and decisions over various trade-o⁄s to be made about various
macroeconomic variables ￿ in￿ ation, the output gap and the real exchange rate gap. The
38Kalman ￿lter estimations of the time-varying parameters shows how rational economic agents
combine past and new information to make new expectations about the state variables.
Secondly, a time-varying parameter model creates more uncertainty in the rule than a ￿xed-
coe¢ cient model. This monetary uncertainty, is estimated by the conditional forecast error and
conditional variance; it can be decomposed into two components, the uncertainty related to the
time-varying parameters and the uncertainty related to the purely monetary shock. Almost all
of the uncertainty comes from time-varying parameters compared to the pure monetary shock.
In the Markov switching regime, 80 percent of the monetary shock uncertainty is estimated to
come from the time-varying parameter uncertainty and 20 percent from the expected regime
change.
Thirdly, the Lucas and Friedman hypothesis about the impact of uncertainty on output are
revisited, using a conditional variance to test them. I ￿nd an inverse relationship between
the magnitude of the response on output to the nominal shock and the variance of this shock.
Moreover, there is a direct negative impact of uncertainty which reduces both output in the
long-term and the long-term growth of potential output. Unanticipated nominal shocks and
the increased volatility of expected in￿ ation, respectively proxied by the forecast error and the
conditional variance of this forecast error, can explain more than 27 percent of the reduction in
the long-term of growth output.
The Lucas test shows that increased volatility of nominal shocks reduce the impact of the
unanticipated shock on the economy. The Friedman test shows that, controlling for the shock,
increased volatility has a direct negative impact on the economy. This paper shows that most
of the uncertainty in the Taylor rule comes from time-varying coe¢ cients. One way to improve
the economy is by keeping coe¢ cients constant. As in the Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon
model, central bankers should stick to the rule and not change coe¢ cients. Coe¢ cients can
change because, either policies change, which is under the control of the central bank, or there
39are structural changes in the economy, such as the introduction of the SIC system in 1988, which
may change structurally the relation between the dependent and the independent variables. In
that case, coe¢ cients change. To reduce the impact on the economy, central bankers can signal
to the public the changes to be made. In fact, we see that central bankers do smooth changes
in the interest rate as the weight on the lagged interest rate is singi￿cant and fairly stable
throughout this thirty years period,estimated at around 0.65 percent. This gradual manner in
reaching the recommended rate does attenuate fairly the changes and the uncertainty linked to
these changes.
To conclude, this paper suggests that (a) regressor coe¢ cients are time-varying and (b) most
of the uncertainty comes from time-varying coe¢ cients rather than the pure monetary shock.
This could suggest a role for central bankers to reduce in as much as possible the uncertainty
linked to time-varying coe¢ cients, either, simply by sticking, if at all possible, to constant
regressor coe¢ cients, or if policy changes due to structural changes in the economy, smoothing
the changes through gradual changes or by being transparent in communicating to the public, as
clearly as possible, the changes that need to be done or the new weights attached to the various
key variables and the timing of the changes to be made to reduce the uncertainty related to
time-varying coe¢ cients.
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43TVP MLE Prmtr Std. Dev. t-stats
sig_e_0 0.1286 0.0837 1.5371
sig_e_1 0.8443 0.2098 4.0248
sig_￿￿
t 0.0600 0.0211 2.8489
sig_e yt￿1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
sig_e yt￿2 0.0129 0.0188 0.6855
sig_e et 0.0000 0.0007 0.0103
sig_￿e
t 0.1290 0.0221 5.8308
sig_r￿
t 0.0000 0.0011 0.0193
sig_it￿1 0.0000 0.0011 0.0193
sig_￿it￿1 0.0344 0.0287 1.1987
sig_mt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0431
Prob_00 0.9840 0.0150 65.4697
Prob_11 0.9602 0.0285 33.7507
Expected (Yearly) Duration for:
Regime 0 15.6245
Regime 1 6.2842
Table 2: Markov Switching Regime TVP
44TVP Lucas MLE Prmtr Std. Dev. t-stat.
sig_" 0.2154 0.1503 1.4329
sig_￿t 0.2579 0.1105 2.3335
sig_￿t 0.0000 0.0119 0.0042
sig_￿t 0.0823 0.1041 0.7902
TVP Mean Values Filtered Smoothed Lucas(1973)
￿￿t -0.1682 -0.1735
￿t 0.6481 0.6476 [.287,.910]
￿t 0.6551 0.6687 [.178,.937]
Table 3: Time-Varying Coe￿cients in the Lucas Equation
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